A methodical and relentless approach is needed against powerful opposition. Whether you've been victimized by fraud, or falsely accused of a crime, you need a skilled advocate on your side, one who has defeated many powerful opponents and is dedicated to your cause. The Law Office of Catherine Park conducts lawsuits involving businesses, condominium disputes, bankruptcy fraud, civil rights, and constitutional claims. The law office also represents criminal defendants in the District of Columbia courts. Catherine Park, Esq., is a member of the District of Columbia Bar, and is admitted to practice before the U.S. District Court for D.C., the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for D.C., and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Catherine Park, Esq., earned a J.D. from Duke University School of Law, and B.A. from Yale University. |
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Civil Defendants: Pros and Cons of Asserting The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination In Civil Cases Civil discovery is almost unlimited, and can force litigants to submit to sworn depositions and to produce evidence in their possession, all of which can be used against them. Civil defendants face a difficult choice when actions for which they're being sued expose them to criminal liability, as well. A civil defendant can assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, for instance, during a deposition, to avoid answering a question. While there may be no other choice when the potential criminal exposure is high, a civil defendant, as a result, may be rendered helpless to defend himself in the civil case. As distinguished from criminal cases, in civil cases a jury or judge is permitted to infer guilt from a defendant's silence or refusal to answer questions. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976). Cases that may force civil defendants to make such a difficult choice include commercial litigation involving fraud, accident cases involving negligence, and any action involving assault—all of which can be civil or criminal violations, depending on the severity of the violation and the government's decision to prosecute. If a criminal investigation or prosecution is already in progress, a civil defendant may seek a stay of the civil action until the criminal case concludes, to avoid giving self-incriminating testimony during discovery in the civil case. The court, however, may deny the request for a stay, to avoid prejudice to the civil plaintiff from long delays in which evidence and witnesses might disappear, or memories fade, or the civil plaintiff be subjected to undue financial hardship. If the criminal prosecution preceded the civil case, the civil defendant may already have sought and obtained immunity during the criminal case. Immunity involves a promise from the prosecutor "not to prosecute" in exchange for testimony, which is used against more culpable defendants. If a civil defendant obtained immunity in the criminal case, it is still incumbent upon him to avoid compromising that immunity. If he is deposed in the civil case, he must refuse to answer questions on Fifth Amendment grounds, even if he is ordered to answer and the trial judge later finds him in contempt, for instance, on the ground that his testimony was immunized in the earlier criminal case. See Pillsbury v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248 (1983). The U.S. Supreme Court in Pillsbury emphasized that deposition questioning could veer into territory that was not immunized, and reversed the contempt finding. The Court stated that the trial judge improperly engaged in predictive judgments, assuming that judges in later criminal prosecutions of the same litigant would find the deposition testimony to fall within the boundaries of the use immunity granted in the earlier case. |
"Owner-Occupied" Condominium Communities : An Unreasonable Restrictive Covenant? A condominium's governing documents frequently prevent condo purchasers from renting their units to residential tenants for a period of one year or so after the initial sale of a new unit. Beyond the typical one-year period, rules and regulations of the Condominium Association may attempt to require owners who want to lease their units to place their names on a waiting list, with only a small percentage of units permitted to be rented at any one time. Such restrictive covenants may or may not be reasonable. Some Condominium Boards are vigilant about maintaining primarily "owner-occupied" communities, on the theory that owners exercise greater care over their property than renters. However where those restrictions go beyond what is necessary to maintain a well-cared for community, such restrictions may violate the property rights of owners, and the civil rights of prospective tenants. In a typical case, an affordable community seeking advantageous property tax credits or in an effort to meet lending criteria limits the number of units that can be rented at any one time. Such restrictions, enacted for a seemingly legitimate purpose, may have a disproportionate impact on certain unit owners, and may violate the civil rights of certain prospective tenants, for instance, those who pay for their rentals through vouchers. In such a scenario, the community association may be skirting dangerously close to violating federal fair housing laws that prohibit discrimination in housing. A well-regulated community is one that is, above all, a prosperous community (financially healthy). Limiting rentals does not contribute to financial health; it wastes resources that could be put to use, and contributes to financial stagnation, not financial growth. Move-In and Move-Out Fees: Are They Legal? The Condo Association generally has broad authority to regulate the internal affairs of the condominium, but such power is not without limit. Move-in and move-out fees are assessments against individual unit owners, and as such are over and above the condo fees paid by the unit owners each month according to their pro rata share of the condominium's expenses. In Westbridge Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Lawrence, 554 A.2d 1163 (D.C. 1989), the D.C. Court of Appeals invalidated a $150 move-in fee imposed by the Condo Association, because the condominium documents did not authorize the levying of such a move-in fee. The condominium documents limited assessments for use of the common elements against individual unit owners to situations involving owner negligence, misuse, and neglect. The Condo Association argued that the move-in fee was necessary because the loading dock, doors to the entryway, elevator, and the common area floor all were used during the move-in. However, the evidence at trial showed that move-in involved merely the temporary and non-exclusive use of common elements. No resident was denied access to the common elements during the move-in, and no damage to the common elements resulted. The trial court held that the move-in fee was an invalid double charge for services already paid for by monthly condo fees. In Westbridge, the Court determined that the Condo Association acted beyond the legal powers granted to it by the condominium documents and by statute. The statutes limited the power of Condo Associations to those expressly granted by the condominium documents, or to those not prohibited by the condominium documents and subject to any limitations therein. |
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